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Introduction: general and computational pragmatics
Pragmatics is the branch of linguistics that studies the relations between linguistic phenomena and aspects of the context of language use. To understand these relations is of crucial importance in many areas of theoretical, computational, and applied linguistics.
In theoretical linguistics, the analysis of such phenomena as anaphora, deixis, and tense requires taking properties into account of the context in which expressions exhibiting these phenomena can be used. Utterances which are context-dependent in such ways are called indexical. Bar-Hillel (1954) has argued that indexicality is pervasive in natural language, and speculated that more than 90% of all declarative utterances are indexical.
Indexical expressions encode information about aspects of context: about objects introduced earlier in the discourse, about objects that form part of the physical and perceptual context, or about the (relative) time of speaking. The information partially encoded in the linguistic expression must become fully specified relative to an actual context in order for the expression to have a determinate meaning. The same goes for expressions that carry presuppositions and conversational implicatures, where the relevant context dimension is formed by the speaker's assumptions about the sharing of beliefs and knowledge with the hearer. Expressions in which these phenomena occur can thus be understood only through the relations between linguistic aspects and context aspects.
The observation that linguistic form may encode context information is in fact not restricted to a small number of aspects of linguistic form, but is a very widespread phenomenon. For instance, the use of definite noun phrases may encode a speaker's assumption about beliefs that are shared with the hearer (presuppositions), and word order and intonation often encode the speaker's intention to structure the information he conveys into a part that is believed to be new for the hearer and a part that is assumed to be known (given-new distinctions), or which part of the information the speaker intends the hearer to focus on (topic-focus distinctions). The linguistic end of pragmatic relations thus involves not only lexical but also syntactic, prosodic, and semantic properties, and in fact it is hard to imagine any linguistic property which may not be relevant to take into account.
An important contribution of pragmatics (or linguistic philosophy, to be more precise, cf. Austin 1962) is the insight that many utterances are best viewed as actions. By speaking, we not only convey information, but also request, assert, order, accuse, deny, threaten, apologise and so on, thereby indicating the function of the information in the context. Languages have distinct sentence structures that can be used to encode some of these functional distinctions explicitly: the indicative, interrogative and imperative moods, and a speaker can use speech act verbs for this purpose within the utterance (e.g. I'm warning you. . . ; I promise. . . ). Despite the facilities languages provide for encoding the intended function of the utterance, the use of indirect speech acts is very common, where a speaker intends his utterance to have a function beyond what he encodes explicitly. The context is again indispensable to the hearer's ability to interpret the speaker's intended meaning in such cases.
Pragmatics also contributes to the related discipline of sociolinguistics, and its application. Where pragmatics studies how relations between utterances and contexts govern speakers' abilities to interpret and plan utterances, sociolinguistics is concerned with the ways in which social relations constrain communicative situations (and in which patterns of communication construct and maintain social relations. cf Berger and Luckmann 1966) . The pragmatic perspective is essential if sociolinguistic hypotheses are to be adequately grounded in linguistics at an explanatory level. Much sociolinguistic research is empirically-based, and uses rather ad-hoc notations and concepts in the transcription and analysis of linguistic data. A clarification of what constitutes context, and of the relation of utterances to context, supplied by research in pragmatics, may provide much better analytic tools for the study of language in social contexts.
Introduction
Much empirical work on the study of linguistic interaction (e.g. (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975) ) has been conducted in classrooms, and the sociolinguistic study of communicative competence (Hymes 1972 ) is based on the appropriateness of utterances to the context of their use. These concepts provide much of the underpinning of curricula in native language development. Both activities are applications of pragmatic and sociolinguistic theories much more than they are applications of the syntactic and semantic analysis of language.
Computational pragmatics is concerned with the same relations between utterances and context that are the concern of sociolinguistics and applied linguistics, but from an explicitly computational point of view. This implies in the first place a concern for how to compute the relations between linguistic aspects and context aspects. There are, evidently two sides to this. On the one hand, given a linguistic expression, the question is how to effectively 'decode' those aspects of it that encode context information, i.e. how to compute the relevant properties of the context. This side of the relation is in focus when the meanings of linguistic expressions are to be computed. On the other hand, when we consider language generation, where the task is to construct a linguistic expression that encodes the context information that the speaker (or writer) wants to convey, the question is how to compute the relevant properties of the linguistic expression to be generated given the relevant properties of the context.
Studying the relations between linguistic phenomena and context properties from a computational point of view means that these relations are considered not in an abstract way, but in terms of effectively building explicit representations at one end of the relation from explicit representations at the other end. This raises questions concerning the details of representations of the relevant properties at either side of the relation, and these questions are more difficult than it may seem at first.
On the linguistic side, studies in syntactic structure, morphology, phonology, and formal semantics have resulted in a rich variety of representational formalisms that have been proposed to represent linguistic phenomena of all kinds. For many of the context-related linguistic phenomena mentioned above (anaphora, deixis, tense, presuppositions) well-defined representation techniques have been developed, although there is no general agreement on what is the best way to represent the various kinds of linguistic properties that utterances may have, and for some types of properties the search for appropriate representations is currently an active area of research (e.g ., semantically relevant prosodic properties, or the representation of ambiguity and vagueness in 'underspecified' logical forms).
The context side of pragmatic relations is much less understood, has not been the subject of a great deal of systematic investigation, and does not enjoy the availability of a wealth of representational formalisms. Investigation of the context side should first of all address the question which kinds of information should be taken into account in context representations. In the above examples of context-dependent linguistic phenomena we have mentioned the following kinds of context information: discourse context: objects that have been introduced in the preceding discourse; physical and perceptual context: objects that are known to be present or visible (or audible, or.. ) in the speaker' and hearer's environment; events and actions perceivable in that environment; spatiotemporal information: (relative) time and place of speaking;
attitudinal context: what a speaker believes, intends, knows, fears,...; what he believes a hearer knows, believes, intends, fears,... The representation of all these kinds of context information in such a way that effective computations can be applied to them and can be used to generate them, is a formidable task, which has so far been accomplished only in part. Moreover, this inventory of aspects of context, relevant for pragmatic relations, is not exhaustive.
General pragmatics being a branch of linguistics, it is no surprise that pragmaticians take an interest not only in relations between linguistic phenomena and context aspects, but also in the linguistic phenomena themselves. Pragmatic studies have in fact looked more at linguistic phenomena that are related to aspects of language use, than at systematic properties of the relations between these phenomena and context, and they have given even less attention to the analysis of the context side of these relations. The analysis of context and the design of context representations has been undertaken only in recent years, primarily in artificial intelligence (see van Deemter and Peters 1996; Iwanska and Zadrozny 1997 ; and the Context'97 conference proceedings), and not always in ways that are useful to the study of language.
Computational pragmatics is a new, emerging subfield of computational linguistics that does not only study linguistic phenomena requiring a contextual explanation, but also investigates the relations between linguistic phenomena and aspects of context with an eye to effective computability, paying equal attention to the analysis and representation of the information at either end of these relations.
Approaches and methods in computational pragmatics

Understanding and inference
The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary holds that the usage of abduction to denote a syllogistic argument with the minor premiss unspecified goes back three centuries. However, the term seems to have fallen out of use until discovered by Peirce, and to have been further neglected until quite recently, as documented by Neal and others in this volume. Almost from the earliest days of natural language processing, certainly as practised by those who preferred to describe their disciplinary allegiance as artificial intelligence (AI) rather than computational linguistics, the importance of inference in language understanding was acknowledged and operationalised. The main characteristic of the inferences studied has been that they rely on premisses which are not part of the content of the utterance itself. Much of this early AI work, particularly that conducted and inspired by Schank, was concerned with the general background knowledge that speaker and hearer must share so that the one can infer what is implied by the other.
Textbook introductions to Pragmatics (Blakemore 1992; Green 1989; Leech 1983; Levinson 1983; Mey 1993) are united in the pre-eminence they give to the view that understanding utterances is achieved by inference as much as by shared linguistic knowledge. The source for this perspective on language understanding is usually traced either to Grice (1975) or to Sperber and Wilson (1986) . Grice is best known for the notion that successful communication relies on an assumption of cooperation or common purpose, and that this assumption helps to supply specific premises used in the unreliable form of inference he termed 'implicature'. Sperber and Wilson dispute Grice's reliance on cooperation but share with him the emphasis on implicature as a vehicle for the communication of intentions. In this literature, the study of implicature is invoked primarily to explain indirect speech acts; how, for example, a statement can communicate a request (1) or a yes/no question a request for specific information (2).
(1)
There's a howling gale in here! = Shut the door/window.
(2) Do you know when the Edinburgh train arrives? = When does the train from Edinburgh arrive?
On the inferential view of communication (contrasted with the code or conduit model by Sperber and Wilson 1986) , these and indeed any utterances or non-linguistic acts function to give evidence of the speaker's intention, and it is primarily intentions that are communicated.
Intentions like the above are not often made explicit in the corresponding utterances. For one thing, being too direct often offends against considerations of politeness or face (Brown and Levinson 1987) . Instead, the process of implicating one's intentions relies on the hearer being able to add appropriate additional assumptions. For example, (1) should enable most understanders of English to supply additional premises and conclusions such as those in (3).
(3)
The speaker has brought a gale to my attention.
The speaker has some attitude to the gale. Gales, winds, etc. lower the apparent temperature by the wind chill factor. 
A: I'm out of gas. B: There's a garage around the corner.
One can say that A's utterance conveys that he would like B to assist in procuring gasoline for him by conventional indirectness. However, according to Grice, A can infer under the CP that B believes that the garage around the corner will be open for the sale of gas by the time A will be able to reach it. Had B any reason to believe that the garage was closed, didn't sell gas, etc., he would under Grice's Maxim of Quantity have had to add something like but I don't think you'll be able to get any there just now. or not mentioned the garage at all. The Maxim of Relation (or Relevance Principle in Sperber and Wilson's terminology) thus helps to constrain which out of all the possible premisses the hearer could supply using his general knowledge, (s)he will add as implicated premiss(es) to take together with the explicit utterance content in order to derive an implicated conclusion. Sperber and Wilson (1986) also point out that logically prior to the process of implicature which Grice described is one of explicature or enrichment of utterance content. Sense disambiguation is one aspect of this process, and appears to need the same sort of inference as the implicatures needed to infer speaker's intention. Such inferences are just as defeasible as implicatures -consider (6) as a continuation of B's utterance in (5), which could lead A to revise the notion that B meant a gas station.
(6)
If you go inside, you'll find a can.
The elaboration of can to can containing gasoline is also necessary to give (7) an interpretation. This kind of analysis leads to a questioning (see also Wilensky et al 1988) of a simple model of utterance interpretation in which first one establishes the 'literal meaning' of an utterance, and then deploys the mechanisms of implicature to uncover the 'nonliteral meaning' or the 'interpretation' of an utterance. We will return to this point in section 2.4.
Independently from the philosophy literature, researchers in natural language processing have long been concerned with various aspects of the problem of determining what is meant by what is said. The part of the problem which Sperber and Wilson have classified as explicature has received the most attention, and manifests itself in the natural language processing (NLP) literature as ambiguity resolution. Examples of the kinds of ambiguity that may have to be resolved are grouping or attachment ambiguity (7); noun-compound structure (8) or interpretation (9); sense ambiguity (10); and reference ambiguity (11) (for further discussion see Bunt 1995b) . (7) (I (bought ((a flat) in London))) (I ((bought (a car)) in London)) (8) (Dynamic ((random access) memory))
The Passport Office = the office that issues passports The Boston Office = the office located in Boston (11) If the baby doesn't thrive on cows' milk, boil it.
Examples (7) to (11) all show that the understanding of utterances depends of knowledge of how things are in the real world -flats are immobile whereas cars are mobile; random access is a way of organising the storage of information, whereas to say that memory is for access is uninformative, and so on. Often, in both the pragmatics and discourse semantics literature and in NLP, utterance interpretation is discussed as though all discourses were monologues. However, spoken utterances most often occur in dialogues. In these situations, utterances not only encode intentions, they also respond to previous utterances and invoke further responses. Words like yes have few felicitous uses except in dialogue when following an utterance by an interlocutor, which strongly constrains how it will be interpreted. One-word utterances like this can be seen as one end of a spectrum of explicitness. Elliptic constructions, where one or more elements in a later part of a sentence have been left out and should be inferred from an earlier part of the sentence, are mostly studied in monologue texts. Such constructions abound in dialogues, where the source of the omitted material is often in the preceding utterance from the other participant, as in: John and perhaps Mary in reply to Who's coming tonight? or as in I believe at four fifteen in reply to Do you know when the next train to Tilburg leaves?
We assume that any NLP system capable of interpreting the intentions behind utterances will need to be able to understand them relative to an evolving context, and that this will involve inference of a non-deductive, indeed an abductive nature.
Mechanising abduction
As we will see from the discussion in the chapters by Neal and by Oberlander and Lascarides in this volume, there are various ways to define abduction, but the common characteristic is that the inference mechanism is permitted to assume additional premisses in order to reach a conclusion deductively.
One of the simplest ways to use abduction in NLP is in parsing with an incomplete lexicon. Suppose we seek to parse the phrase the driblet containing a rare word not in the lexicon. The grammar contains a rule np ! det n and the lexicon has the entry det ! the, but no entry Cat ! driblet. Such a situation can be remedied to give a syntactic analysis of np(det(the),n(driblet)) by a rule that says n ! Word if Word is not already listed as a n. Since parsing with rules and a lexicon of ground terms as premisses amounts to constructing a deductive proof of phrasehood, parsing with the same rules and an infinitely extendable lexicon corresponds to constructing an abductive proof of phrasehood. Hobbs, Stickel, Appelt, and Martin (1993) use (12) as an expository example of several problems that can be solved in the interpretation-as-abduction paradigm, which they characterise as (13). (12) The Boston office called.
Prove the logical form of the sentence, together with the constraints that predicates impose on their arguments, allowing for coercions, merging redundancies where possible, making assumptions where necessary.
Boston office is an example of a noun compound, whose interpretation requires the relation between the second and the first noun to be determined from among located in, owned by, used for, etc. The definite reference of the Boston office also needs to be resolved, as does the metonymic relation between the office and the human caller. Just to take the noun compound interpretation problem, the syntax/semantics rule accepting a n 1 _ n 2 sequence assigns a semantic representation of the form n tically marked as definite, any arbitrary instantiation of y would yield an alternative proof or interpretation, since there may be other offices than O located in Boston, and other known offices with different relations to Boston than location. Hobbs, Stickel, Appelt, and Martin (1993) go on to point out that in their approach of weighted abduction, it is relatively costly to assume facts corresponding to the definite NPs in 2 In these examples, variables are prefixed by an underscore . Any symbol (excluding operators) not prefixed by an underscore is either a predicate or an individual constant, according to context. l 0 denotes the predicate corresponding to the lexeme l, but where a predicate and any corresponding lexeme are spelt differently, there is no prime. the sentence. In their approach, differential costs propagated through the proof trees determine which of the provable interpretations will be favoured.
An alternative way to implement abduction, not dissimilar in spirit to Hobbs et al's heuristic of making the fewest assumptions, is that used by Guessoum and Gallagher (see their chapter in this volume, and Lloyd 1990, 1991) . In their approach, derived from the theory of deductive databases, generalisations about the world are represented as integrity constraints. Their paradigm for language processing is to seek to add new propositions derived from the utterance into an integrity-preserving knowledge base management system or belief revision system (cf Gärdenfors 1992) and to make the fewest/cheapest additional assumptions (or retractions) rel(O 1 ; B) is assumable more cheaply will be the preferred way to restore integrity.
As with Hobbs et al's approach, it is up to the knowledge engineer to ensure that the costs are assigned to assumable predicates appropriately.
Reasoning about beliefs
We earlier noted some characteristics of the pragmatic perspective on language use: linguistic behaviour is action; communication is the activity of getting intentions across; speakers give evidence of their intentions, relying on their interlocutors to be able to combine that evidence with background knowledge as well as the specific context of the interaction. Both speakers and hearers are primarily working with beliefs about the other in communicating intentions. Searle claims (Searle 1969 ) that a speech act of assertion is not felicitous unless the speaker has reason to believe that the hearer does not already believe the proposition to be true; similarly a warning is not necessary if the speaker believes the hearer already knows of the circumstance and the danger that it poses. The indirect speech act exemplified by (2) above apparently requires reasoning by the hearer that the speaker did not only have curiosity about the hearer's mental state, but had some intention that could be served by her/himself knowing the time of the train.
Given the centrality of reasoning about beliefs, a computational pragmatics system will require an inference engine that can reason about beliefs. In the previous section, we discussed abductive reasoning without discussing the specific problems of reasoning about anything beyond classical predicate logic (or even simpler systems like Horn clause logic or Prolog). We cannot reason about beliefs without a more expressive logic than that, because believes is not an ordinary predicate, but an operator that induces an opaque context. Whereas in predicate logic we can substitute equivalent expressions and preserve truth, it does not follow from Believes (Oedipus, married(Oedipus, Iocasta) ) and Iocasta = Oedipus' mother that Believes (Oedipus, married(Oedipus, Oedipus' mother) ), because the belief operator is opaque to truthpreserving substitutions. The more expressive logic that we need to reason about beliefs includes axioms and rules of inference in addition to those of classical predicate logic, such as the ones in (14). Knowing something can be distinguished from belief by the axiom of knowledge (14b), which has no counterpart for belief. Modelling a rational agent, we have to decide which additional axioms and inference rules express its powers of inference, and several have been proposed from time to time. Axiom (14c), for example, empowers the agent to apply Modus Ponens within his knowledge space; axiom (14d) makes an agent's knowledge a subsets of his beliefs, and rule (14e) empowers an agent to know everything that can be proved in the logic. (14) a.
if` then`K a Axiom (a), being recursive, generates an infinite set of beliefs. (Moreover, the can be an expression denoting a belief of someone else, so it is easy to produce expressions
). This implies that any mechanism we employ to reason about beliefs will be constrained not to infer all the consequences of a belief, but rather to investigate whether a specific belief is true.
The axiom of distribution (14c), together with (14d) and the axioms of predicate logic with equality, would ensure that if Oedipus beliefs include both that married(Oedipus,Iocasta) and that Iocasta = Oedipus' mother, he would also believe married (Oedipus,Oedipus' mother) .
The axioms of a deductive logic of belief or knowledge do not on their own help much with the reasoning about an interlocutor's belief that we do in linguistic communication, although they can help avoid error that might arise from treating believes as an ordinary predicate. We need to be able to make assumptions about the beliefs of others in the absence of any direct evidence. We need, for example, to be able to assume by default that another member of the same linguistic community has access to most of the same general knowledge that we have, but perhaps not all of the specific local, personal, professional and interest-related things that we know. We need to be able to abduce from an utterance when a speaker apparently does not know something and believes that we may know it. Building a model of a rational agent, we also need to have a mechanism for taking on beliefs that we believe others have when we see no reason not to accept them.
In addition to beliefs, a rational agent must also reason about intentions; his own and those of others. This involves also reasoning about sequences of actions (i.e. plans) that will bring about those intentions (as well as any harmful side-effects that some alternative actions or plans might have). This kind of reasoning requires to be supported with an appropriate formal system, such as situation calculus ((McCarthy and Hayes 1969) ). Furthermore, in interpreting the behaviour of others, unlike planning our own actions, the operators of the calculus must be used abductively and not deductively: that is to say, utterances give clues to intentions but no more.
Dynamic context, utterance interpretation and response planning
One strand of enquiry in computational pragmatics is to seek to apply the principles of rational agenthood to the modelling of a (computer-based) dialogue participant, where a rational communicative agent is endowed not only with certain private knowledge and the logic of belief, but is considered to also assume a great deal of common knowledge/beliefs with an interlocutor, and to be able to update beliefs about the interlocutor's intentions and beliefs as a dialogue progresses.
In dialogues that take place in service encounters, the client has a preconceived idea of the kinds of thing the service agent knows, or s/he wouldn't even begin the dialogue. S/he is also aware that it is the role of the service agent to provide information and possibly to effect transactions on behalf of the enquirer/customer. For his/her part, the service agent will expect the customer to have some intention which can be put into effect by the service (e.g. a plan to travel somewhere). This kind of dialogue takes place, then, in a situation which is very far from a 'null context', in which the knowledge and intentions of the parties are predictable in general terms from their roles, but which each party will try to make specific by their initial moves in the dialogue. Like all beliefs, even the beliefs in this background context may turn out to be wrong (the agent doesn't know about other companies' services, isn't familiar with the geographical situation, etc.), but broadly speaking the knowledge of roles etc. provides the static context in which a dialogue takes place.
A dynamic context is immediately set up by any communicative act, which (normatively and logically) both directs and constrains what either party can do next, and provides a resource of mutually available knowledge that can be exploited in planning and interpreting successive utterances. Suppose an air travel agent opens a dialogue with Where would you like to go to? If the customer says the name of a place, e.g.
Chicago, the agent is entitled to form a belief B me W he flyto(he; here; chicago; ); the context set up by the question enables the agent to interpret the elliptical answer as an assertion that the client wants to go to Chicago. Moreover, the static institutional and role context allows travel to to be specialised to flyto, since the agent is there to act for an airline, and by default believes that the client knows this.
The dynamic context contains some kind of trace of previous utterances. This trace is partly at the surface level, since the act of saying something changes the context in that this something has (just) been said now, and dialogue participants can explicitly refer to this, as in Did you say "Thursday"? or in Could you please repeat that? (Note also that repeating something does not leave the context unchanged, as something has then been said twice. See further Isard 1975 and Bunt 1994.) If this trace is purely at the surface level, however, the utterances in it would have to be (re-)analysed before any reasoning could take place, so it is going to be more efficient to also record semantic/logical representations. The context also contains recollections of the things that have been talked about. For example, if a travel agent has just quoted details of a specific flight, the enquirer can use anaphora in seeking further information, e.g. Does it stop at New York? since the flight is the most salient thing in the context for both of them. If there were other 'discourse objects' equally accessible, we could bring in shared world knowledge, such as 'stopping is a thing that flights sometimes do' to help choose between them (as would be the case in deciding in this example that 'it' refers to the flight, not to its price). Note that discourse objects do not necessarily correspond to objects in the real world, as the following example illustrates: (15) C: Could you please book me on the first available KLM flight to Beijing, and tell me how much it costs? I: I'm sorry Sir, there are no KLM flights to Beijing.
The second sentence makes clear that the it toward the end of the first sentence does not refer to any real-world object; it refers to the discourse object the first available KLM flight to Beijing.
Noticing that dialogue participants tend to be relatively well-behaved, and to some extent predictable, linguists have been tempted to look at the regular patterns of utterances in dialogues and hence to classify utterances as types of speech act or dialogue act. 3 We may expect to find that greetings and valedictions tend to get paired up with similar utterances, and that in the body of a dialogue we get lots of initiative-response pairs such as question-answer. It is also noticeable that if an expected response does not occur, a sub-dialogue often appears to take place, and when completed, the original initiative-response pair resumes. Observations like these have suggested to some researchers that context is structured in terms of a 'grammar' of dialogue, which is capable of being modelled on phrase structure grammar or finite state grammar (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975, Roulet 1985) . If we base a representation of context on this idea, we could say that if a rule for an initiative-response exchange has been fired top down, and an initiative has just been uttered, the active rule contains a prediction of a response, which can be used in the interpretation of the next utterance when it comes. One criticism of this approach is that such rules only take utterance functions into account, not utterance content. They say such things as that a THANKING requires an ACKNOWLEDGEMENT to follow, and a QUESTION requires and ANSWER; they are unable to capture semantic requirements such as that an answer should supply information that corresponds to meeting (or at least being relevant for reducing) the information need expressed by the QUESTION. Another criticism is that the rules demanding the occurrence of a certain type of dialogue act sometimes fail. The following dialogue fragment, based on an example from (Luzzati 1995) M's first question in this dialogue never gets an answer, and neither does the indirect request for information expressed by U's first utterance (and U's expression of gratitude in 7 does not get acknowledged either). What happens is that, when M does not immediately get an answer to his question 2, instead of bothering to pursue it he decides that another issue, namely U's question 3 is more important. This being understood by M after utterance 5, and moreover the answer 6 obviating the question 1, neither participant bothers dealing any further with the pending questions 1 and 2. At the end of the dialogue, M's valediction in response to U's valediction seems to make an acknowledgement of U's expression of thanks unnecessary. This illustrates that grammar rules, requiring questions to be answered and thanks to be acknowledged, are descriptively inadequate, even when we forget about the requirement of propositional content relations. They are clearly also analytically inadequate, in having no explanatory power whatsoever. The rigidity of a strictly prescriptive dialogue grammar can be overcome by making such a grammar probabilistic, but this would introduce the fundamentally suspicious idea that the choice of one's communicative actions in a dialogue is made statistically depending on what was said before, rather than determined by intentions and other contextual considerations. The VERBMOBIL project makes use of a probabilistic grammar of dialogue act types (see Alexandersson, Maier and Reithinger 1995) , but merely as a heuristic device to help the automatic recognition of dialogue acts in spoken dialogues for the purpose of the computer translation of dialogue utterances.
The theoretical importance of dialogue acts lies not in their possible use in dialogue grammars, but in their use as context-changing operations. On this view, a dialogue act of a certain type (i.e., with a certain communicative function) has a certain type of effect on the dynamic context; this approach is elaborated in Dynamic Interpretation Theory; see Bunt's chapter in this volume, and see the discussion of pragmatics-based language processing systems in section 3.
Cooperation and rationality
We have noted above that the use of context information in language understanding and generation processes requires the application of abduction-type forms of (hypothetical) reasoning. Among the various kinds of context information that speakers and listeners use, their beliefs about each other's beliefs play a central role, since the effects of communicative actions are always achieved via the changes they may bring about in the listeners' beliefs about the speaker. It therefore seems appropriate to call abduction, belief and context the ABC of computational pragmatics.
These three ABC concepts together form a clear, coherent picture: we perform hypothetical reasoning when we combine beliefs and other pieces of context information with information extracted from utterances, adding hypotheses where needed to obtain coherent interpretations and consistent belief states. There is another C, however, which we have also seen to be very important in pragmatics: that of cooperation. How does cooperation fit into this picture? And we may ask the same question about another concept that is often claimed to be fundamental in pragmatics: rationality. Action-based approaches to language, such as Speech Act Theory, Communicative Activity Analysis (see Allwood 1994; , and Dynamic Interpretation Theory (see Bunt 1990; assume that communication is a form of rational activity, where the participants use communicative acts to achieve communicative as well as noncommunicative goals in a rational way. The place of rationality and cooperation in the ABC picture follows from the coherence and consistency that the inferential processes aim to establish when they combine utterance information with context information.
In language understanding, the combination of utterance information and context information appears to serve two purposes:
1. to supplement utterance information, which is more often than not insufficient to construct a coherent interpretation of the utterance; 2. to specialise or shift (in the case of indirect speech acts, of irony, of metaphoric use,..) an interpretation of an utterance to the one that the speaker intended.
For instance, in example (4a) above: Where do I sign. Do you have a pen? context information is used for the first purpose when interpreting the indexicals I and you, and for the second purpose when specialising the meaning of Where to At which place in this document rather than, for instance, to In which room and when interpreting pen as writing implement, rather than as enclosure for domestic animals; context information is used for the second purpose when shifting the interpretation of Do you have a pen? from a yes/no-question to a request. Grice 1975 has suggested that the use of context for computing intended interpretations and implicatures relies on first constructing a literal meaning, with its ambiguities resolved and its referents specified. The cooperation principle is then applied to this literal meaning in combination with contextual information such as the (mutual) beliefs and intentions of speaker and addressee to compute an intended meaning.
Upon closer inspection, the distinction between these two purposes turns out to be problematic, however, as is the very notion of 'literal meaning' (see also Gibbs 1989; Searle 1978) . Consider, for instance, the interpretation of an utterance containing an anaphoric pronoun. In order to construct a coherent interpretation for the utterance, an antecedent must be chosen. Being an aspect of referential interpretation, this would appear to be an activity serving the first purpose, and in Grice's terminology to form part of constructing a literal meaning. Yet the choice of an antecedent clearly depends on what antecedent the speaker is believed to have intended. It makes no sense to assign an antecedent to an anaphoric pronoun without taking into account what the speaker is likely to have intended; the whole point of anaphora resolution is to find the intended antecedent. For anaphoric expressions, a literal meaning as distinguished from the intended meaning does not seem to make a great deal of sense.
Similarly for ambiguous and vague expressions. To understand the first utterance in the example just considered, Where must be interpreted. At this point, answers such as At the bottom of this document and In the chancellor's office are both possible. Again, it would make no sense to first attempt to choose between such interpretations without taking into account what the speaker was likely to mean; the point of disambiguation is to determine the intended meaning. (If speaker intention-independent information were available to allow this determination, the expression would not be ambiguous in this respect.) 'Literal meanings' of ambiguous expressions, which would apply out of context, or in a hypothetical 'null context', again do not seem to make sense.
We may conclude that constructing a coherent interpretation of an utterance amounts to using contextual information for obtaining an interpretation that is not only internally coherent, in that all the elements of utterance information are semantically linked to concepts in the interpreter's knowledge and with each other, but also contextually coherent, in that they are linked with elements in the local context, including the interpreter's beliefs about the speaker's intentions. Rationality and cooperativeness play their part as properties of the way an agent reasons when trying to establish internal and contextual coherence, in the following way.
Both rationality and cooperativeness are properties of the way an agent acts. Rationality is an 'inward-looking' property, relating an agent's actions to his goals and intentions in a manner that is both instrumental and efficient: a rational agent chooses his actions in such a way that they lead toward his goals and do so at minimal 'cost'. (Where 'cost' is anything that is unpleasant for the agent to spend, such as effort, or time. For an analysis of rationality see Allwood 1976 .) The above example Do you have a pen illustrates this: the speaker is understood after the utterance Where do I sign? as having the intention to sign a document; the second sentence is interpreted as requesting a writing implement because that would be instrumental to this intention. The inferential processes combining utterance and context information may also be assumed to be rational; in fact, rationality might seem to be an inherent property of inference processes, but when one considers the 'inference engines' that have been built in artificial intelligence, it is clear that this assumption is by no means obvious. In fact, one of the main difficulties in building such engines is to develop strategies that guide the engine so as to only make relevant inference steps.
Cooperativeness is 'outward-looking' in that it relates an agent's actions to the assumed goals and intentions of his dialogue partner. This plays an obviously important role in the generation of communicative actions that make 'cooperative' behaviour. In order to be able to act cooperatively w.r.t. a partner B, an agent A must have beliefs about B's goals; such beliefs typically derive from A's interpretation of B's behaviour. In order to correctly induce B's goals and beliefs from his communicative behaviour, this interpretation process must be based on the assumption of B acting rationally and cooperatively.
Together, rationality and cooperativeness thus provide the goals, beliefs and intentions that the inference processes aim to connect to utterances during utterance interpretation. On the generation side, cooperativeness and rationality likewise provide the properties of contexts that communicative actions aim to achieve, and constrain the choice of communicative actions to realise that. Rationality and cooperativeness thus guide a dialogue participant's reasoning and planning processes in interpretation and generation, and in this way fit into the ABC picture outlined above.
Pragmatics in language understanding systems 1.3.1 Robustness through pragmatics
Since the 1960s, attempts have been made to build systems with the ability to understand natural language to a nontrivial extent. The language processing in firstgeneration language understanding systems (as well as in more recent systems that expressly aim at a very restricted form of understanding) draws primarily on lexical and syntactic resources and is aimed at the recognition of terms and patterns that have a special significance for the application at hand.
4 Semantics in these systems is mostly restricted to the specification of the application-specific significance of words and phrases, or to incorporating domain-specific syntactic notions as elements in a 'semantic grammar.' 5 Pragmatics, in the sense of taking context into account in a principled way, plays virtually no role at all in these systems.
Attempts to build full-fledged language understanding systems started with Winograd's SHRDLU system (Winograd 1972 ) and Woods' LUNAR system (Woods et al. 1972) . These pioneering systems were based on the use of combinations of syntactic and semantic rules, allowing to parse a sentence into its components and to compute the semantic consequences of the syntactic structure. The LUNAR system did not incorporate any pragmatics, aiming only at answering isolated data base queries; the SHRDLU system did incorporate some dialogue facilities and context-dependent interpretation and generation functions, but only in a fragmented and ad hoc way. Continued research on computer understanding of natural language has since the late seventies resulted in a number of experimental systems with increasing capabilities, though until recently taking context information into account only in the following limited ways: using knowledge of the application domain in the form of domain-specific lexica and/or syntactic categories; 4 Restricted forms of language understanding can be useful for a variety of computer applications, such as special-purpose user interfaces (data base querying, information retrieval, voice command systems,..), linguistically-supported text processing, or translation aids. 5 Semantic grammars have been developed in the PLANES system (Waltz, Finin, Green, Conrad, Goodman and Hadden 1978) and in the LIFER/LADDER system (Hendrix, Sacerdoti, Sagalowicz and Slocum 1978) . For other early systems aiming at restricted but potentially useful forms of language understanding see e.g. Harris (1978) and Thompson and Thompson (1978) . using knowledge of the tasks of the application in a crude determination of the communicative functions of utterances (e.g. whether an utterance is a QUES-TION or a CONFIRMATION); using dynamic information about the history of the dialogue and about the state of the current task for keeping track of discourse referents, for anaphora r esolution, and for planning the next system action.
Systems that use contextual information only in these limited ways are bound to be very restricted in their understanding capabilities, as is obvious from the pervasive influence of dynamic as well as static context on the interpretation and generation of utterances in concrete communicative situations as discussed above. One of the ways in which these limitations show up is that natural language systems are notoriously fragile, failing when confronted with imperfect input, or input which has not been anticipated by the system designer. While natural language is an extremely powerful means of communication between partners that share a rich background of contextual knowledge, natural language utterances are hopelessly ambiguous, vague, and informationally incomplete for an interpreter who does not have access to such a background. For an interpreter with poor context information, the interpretation of utterances is bound to break down very easily.
A system that does not break down in unexpected or problematic situations, but that behaves appropriately in all conditions, is called robust. In order to increase the robustness of his system, the designer often adds special rules to the grammar or relaxes some of the constraints in grammar rules and lexical items to cover cases that were unanticipated before (allowing for instance certain frequently occurring typing errors or grammatical errors). In addition, techniques are often applied that may be classified as 'low-level': automatic spelling correction, on-line lexical acquisition, semantic grammars, and so on. These low-level techniques miss the heart of the problem, which is to react appropriately in a context created or updated by the fact that a user has said or typed something at a keyboard with the express purpose of communicating a message that is meaningful in the current context. A pragmatics-based approach, by contrast, takes as its point of departure that the user has the intention of communicating a meaningful message, and aims at reconstructing this message by considering the signals that the user sends within the current context.
In the rest of this section we describe a number of experimental language understanding systems that have marked advances in the use of contextual information and pragmatic knowledge in natural language processing. We will see that, in the course of time, an increasingly prominent place is given to contextual information as a knowledge source in interpretation and generation, and to pragmatic concepts and principles in dialogue management.
PHLIQA, TENDUM, SPICOS, and CLE
In the PHLIQA question-answering system (Bronnenberg et al. 1979 ), a level of analysis was distinguished with semantic representations in a formal language where the terms correspond to syntactically differentiated word senses, and another level with terms denoting concepts in a discourse domain. The terms at the first level preserve much of the ambiguity and vagueness of the corresponding words. At the second level, ambiguity and vagueness are resolved relative to the granularity of the domain model. The first level can be said to be 'context-independent' and the second to be 'contextdependent', if 'context' is taken in the sense of domain of discourse. The analysis at the 'context-independent' level represents only the semantic consequences of syntactic structure and of the use of function words.
The importance of the PHLIQA system is mainly that it pioneered the use of socalled metavariables in meaning representations. Metavariables are best considered as placeholders for semantic choices that still have to be made. In the PHLIQA system this technique was developed for lexical meaning; for instance, an adjective like Canadian that, depending on the context, can mean such things as made in Canada (car), situated in Canada (city), having departed from Canada (airplane), owned by a Canadian (!) company (airplane), representing Canada (flag), etc., corresponds to the metavariable canadian, which at the context-dependent level of interpretation is replaced by an instance that is both relevant in the domain and applicable to the object corresponding to the noun that the adjective modified.
The TENDUM dialogue system (Bunt et al. 1984 ) went a step further in recognising that the resolution of structural ambiguity and vagueness in general also requires domain knowledge. This applies for instance to deciding whether a quantification is to be taken collectively or distributively, and to whether a noun is to be taken as a count noun (like rope in a long rope) or as a mass noun (as in a metre of rope). Representations were designed that leave quantifier distributivity and mass/count distinctions underspecified, by using metavariables to represent these choices. A family of representation languages was implemented, called the EL family (Bunt 1985) , for the TENDUM system to achieve this.
Innovative in the TENDUM system was thus the use of metavariables corresponding to localised sources of non-lexical ambiguity. The system was also innovative in its approach to dialogue pragmatics, using local and global context to manage the dialogue with the user; this aspect is considered in the next section.
The SPICOS system, a joint Philips-Siemens research experiment and a precursor in some respects of the VERBMOBIL project (see below), re-implemented many of the TENDUM techniques for semantic analysis in the context of a document retrieval application with a German speech front-end (see van Deemter et al. 1985; Thurmair 1989) , thereby showing the generality of these techniques.
Unlike the systems mentioned above, the Core Language Engine (CLE; Alshawi 1992) was not aimed at performing a specific interactive task like data base question answering (PHLIQA), document retrieval through spoken queries (SPICOS) or travel information supply through typed dialogue (TENDUM), but was intended as a general-purpose natural language front-end customisable to a variety of applications. The CLE provides a translation from English sentences to underspecified representations of their propositional content in structures called Quasi-Logical Forms (QLFS).
Like the intermediate representations of the TENDUM system, these structures are intended to describe context-independent meaning aspects; the design of QLFS was focused specifically on the representation of unscoped quantifiers. The QLF notation (Alshawi 1990 ) was indeed quasi-logical in the sense that the notation, though looking more or less like a formal language, had no semantic definition, unlike the formal representations used in the PHLIQA and TENDUM systems (see Landsbergen and Scha 1979; Bunt 1985) . A definition of the semantics of QLFs has been given later in terms of their possible unambiguous instantiations (Alshawi and Crouch 1992) .
TENDUM, TRAINS, and Verbmobil
The TENDUM system was also innovative in attempting to deal not only with truthconditional aspects of meaning but also with 'pragmatic' meaning aspects by treating dialogue utterances as communicative acts, which have communicative functions that capture the speaker's intentions and associated beliefs and other attitudes. The analysis of user utterances in the TENDUM system thus includes identifying goals and beliefs of various sorts that are attributed to the user, and which together constitute a user model. Assigning an interpretation to a user utterance in this system depends not only on the global context formed by the discourse domain, but also on the more 'local' context formed by the current user model. Consider, for instance, the following fragment taken from a recorded telephone dialogue: Utterance 4 in this fragment is a near-perfect copy of utterance 3, also in its intonation; yet it clearly has a different function. We understand utterance 3 as a verification and 4 as a confirmation because of the goals and beliefs we attribute to the participants at the relevant points in the dialogue.
For a dialogue system to play the role of S in this fragment, the understanding of the user's utterance 3 thus requires the system to consult the user model it has built up at that point. In the TENDUM system, the user model containing the user's beliefs and intentions is the backbone of the local context model, i.e. of the model of that contextual information that changes through the dialogue (as opposed to the global context, the contextual information that remains unaffected by the dialogue). Local and global context information are used in the system both to interpret the user's utterances (and are crucial in cases like utterance 3 above and for the recognition of indirect speech acts) and to generate the system's next dialogue contribution. The design of the system's context model and pragmatic processing modules has been a source of inspiration for developing Dynamic Interpretation Theory (see Bunt, this volume) .
Other dialogue systems, such as SUNDIAL (Peckham 1993; Eckert and McGlashan 1993) and TRAINS (Allen et al. 1995) have used more or less similar combinations of representing local and global context information, focusing on the current beliefs and intentions, and using speech act concepts both to interpret user utterances and to generate system contributions.
The TRAINS system, for example, is an intelligent planning assistant that helps the user by interacting in natural language to construct plans for using a railroad freight system. Like TENDUM, it takes a speech act theoretical approach to dialogue and manages a dialogue by taking into account various types of local and global context information. Similar to the systems mentioned above, a user utterance in TRAINS is first assigned a context-independent, underspecified meaning representation, called an 'Unscoped Logical Form' (ULF). In order to operate with these ULFs, the system uses the following context information: (1) beliefs shared by the user and the system; (2) communicative intentions that the system has, in the form of intended speech acts plus the reason for performing the act; (3) a segmentation of the dialogue as a stack of 'discourse units'; (4) knowledge about plans for using the freight system; (5) a set of 'conversational obligations' (for instance, a question generates an obligation to answer).
The system uses this context information for interpreting ULFs, e.g. using the (in-)accessibility of discourse units to interpret anaphora, as well as for managing the dialogue, using e.g. the shared beliefs and the current conversational obligations to detect the communicative function of a utterance and to compute the system's next contribution to the dialogue (see further Traum 1994, chapter 6) .
The German mega-project VERBMOBIL has as its long-term goal the development of a prototype system for the translation of spoken dialogue utterances to support two persons with different native languages (Japanese and German) who conduct a business conversation in English (see Wahlster, 1993 , for more details about the objectives of the project). Dialogue utterances are to be translated from Japanese or German into English on demand. The system, of which a first prototype was completed in 1997 that supports a dialogue with the goal to find a date for a business meeting, therefore has two processing modes:
Deep processing when one of the dialogue participants requests a translation. In this mode, the input goes through phases of speech recognition and syntactic and semantic analysis for the source language; dialogue processing; transfer; and generation and speech synthesis for the target language.
Shallow processing when the dialogue participants interact without requesting a translation. In order to follow the dialogue superficially, a key word spotter examines the input for cue words which are characteristic for certain dialogue steps.
In the 'deep processing' mode, the VERBMOBIL system interprets the input as a speech act (or more accurately, as a 'dialogue act' in the sense of Dynamic Interpretation Theory; see Jekat et al. 1995 and Bunt, this volume) and uses contextual information both for utterance interpretation and for dialogue management.
A key issue in the VERBMOBIL project is to develop robust processing methods that can cope with unreliable and incomplete input as is typical for spoken language systems. One important means to achieve this is the availability of contextual information. This information is used e.g. to disambiguate translational equivalents during transfer, to resolve anaphoric expressions, to control lexical variation in the generation of target expressions, and to recognise indirect speech acts.
Local context information in the VERBMOBIL system has two main parts, chronologically and conceptually ordered, respectively:
1. a 'sequence memory' reflecting the sequential order in which the utterances and the related dialogue acts have occurred in the dialogue;
2. a 'thematic structure', representing the propositional contents that have been communicated and their status in the dialogue, i.e. who they have been proposed by and whether they have already been accepted or rejected.
The two components are closely intertwined to permit easy access of all information for every utterance of the dialogue (see further Maier 1995; . Different from dialogue systems, dialogue management in VERBMOBIL is used not for generating system contributions, since the system does not participate in the dialogue as such, but in order to predict follow-up speech acts in dialogue processing. The dialogue management component has a hybrid architecture containing both statistical and rule-based methods, both using dialogue acts as basic units of processing (see Alexandersson et al. 1995; Reithinger and Maier 1995) .
PLUS and DenK
The Esprit project PLUS ('Pragmatics-based Language Understanding System') started from the point of view that the robustness of language understanding systems could benefit greatly from taking contextual information into account in order to deal with linguistic imperfections, unanticipated constructions, unknown or misspelled words, etc. This view was incorporated in a design where a kind of quasi-logical form language was defined (Geurts and Rentier 1993) and an HPSG grammar was developed producing such forms as intermediate semantic representations; these were subsequently translated into a restricted form of EL-representations, and abduction was used to bring contextual information to bear in the interpretation in order to produce representations that are free of ambiguity or vagueness, relative to the domain of discourse. This design has been developed and implemented in a prototype system (see below).
Several components of the PLUS system were reused in the DENK system (Bunt et al. 1998 ) which was built with the aim to construct a generic cooperative multimodal user interface, combining natural language with other modalities, in particular with direct manipulation of objects in a visual representation of the domain of discourse. The DENK system reused, refined, and reimplemented the PLUS quasi-logical form language, renaming it the language of underspecified logical form (ULF) (Kievit 1996) . ULF representations are on the one hand related to English dialogue utterances by means of an HPSG parser in which the semantic structures, standard in HPSG, have been replaced by ULF representations, and on the other hand to disambiguated representations in the logically powerful formalism of type theory. Type theory has been originally developed for foundational research in mathematics, and has also been applied in the theory of programming languages and in the semantics of natural language (see De Bruijn 1980; Barendregt 1991; Ahn and Kolb 1990) . Research in the DENK project has shown the great potential of type-theoretical representations as formalisations of context information, provided the representation structures and proof methods of standard type theory are extended in order to model beliefs and intentions of agents participating in a dialogue (see Borghuis 1995; Ahn and Borghuis 1998) . In the DENK system, type theory is used for the semantic representation of the utterances exchanged by the user and the system; for representing the system's knowledge of the discourse domain; and for representing the beliefs that the system believes to be shared with the user.
The DENK system implements the ideas of Dynamic Interpretation Theory (see Bunt, this volume), using dialogue acts, defined as context-changing operations, as the units in terms of which pragmatic principles in dialogue behaviour are defined, whose implementation form the system's dialogue management component (Piwek 1998 ).
A Pragmatics-based Language Understanding System
The PLUS project has been exceptional in not just accepting that a language understanding system should take the pragmatic aspects of language understanding seriously, and make use of contextual information in principled ways, but going a step further and taking the stand that language understanding should be driven by pragmatics. By this we mean that syntactic, semantic and pragmatic analysis cooperate not in the traditional way, where pragmatic analysis is applied as a filter on what syntactic and semantic analysis have produced, but in such a way that pragmatics actively influences how syntactic and semantic analysis should operate and what kind of information they should deliver.
A pragmatics-based language understanding system is robust for the same fundamental reason why human interlocutors are 'robust' in the sense that they have little difficulty in understanding each other's utterances also when these are incomplete, ambiguous, grammatically imperfect, or corrupted by noise. Human interlocutors have this ability not because they employ special rules for ungrammatical sentences, or spelling correction algorithms, but because they apply pragmatic knowledge to supplement or correct information coming from syntactic and semantic processing. Context information allows one to add missing elements, to infer the intended interpretation of an ambiguous utterance, and to check, clarify or correct results from syntacticsemantic processing when they don't fit in the current context. The principal characteristic of a pragmatics-based system would be robustness and flexibility in a wide range of situations: the system should be capable of handling unexpected input (such as extra-grammatical sentences, 'elliptical' fragments, misspellings, unknown proper names and other unknown words,..) but also of dealing with more complex issues such as deriving conversational implicatures, determination of relevance, deriving speaker beliefs, and other context-related issues needed to allow a real dialogue with the user.
The keynote of the PLUS project was to achieve robustness and flexibility in human-computer dialogue by treating dialogue as a communicative activity whose essential characteristic is to convey a meaning that is both appropriate and relevant contextually. Since the intention of a human speaker is to convey an intended message, and since all messages occur in some context, it is crucially important to exploit this context in the derivation of the intended interpretation. Central in the PLUS project was the exploitation of both pragmatic and linguistic phenomena, such as interpretation with respect to context, and the power of inference tools derived from non-linguistic problems, in order to provide reasoning-based robustness in language understanding by integrating these two areas.
In order to demonstrate the capabilities of the PLUS system on a realistically sized application, an interactive Yellow Pages Information Service was chosen as the demonstrator. Some of the chapters in this volume refer to various components of the PLUS system and the way they handle aspects of context, inference, etc., and occasionally use the terminology adopted in PLUS. It is therefore helpful to conclude a description of this system with an outline of the architecture adopted.
System architecture
One important aspect of a natural language component is the workload needed to integrate natural language interaction in a new application. For some NL systems everything has to be re-built from lexicon to semantic representation and semantic evaluation. The PLUS architecture clearly differentiates what is specific to the language (lexicon, grammar), what is specific to the application (application model) and what is independent of both language and application (basic knowledge), such as conversational rules and deductive mechanisms.
This separation minimises the cost of building a new application. Only the part specific to the application needs to be developed, language specific parts and basic knowledge need only extensions or additions. This modularity reduces also the cost of adding a new language to the capabilities of the system. This makes the evolution towards a multilingual tool feasible, and indeed English and French demonstrator versions were constructed. Figure 1 .1 shows the conceptual relationships between the major declarative and functional system components. The aim of input understanding is to determine how the model of the current context, in particular of the user's beliefs and intentions, is to be updated. This determination is carried out by the Dialogue Manager (henceforth DM) module with the help of an abductive inference engine, called the Problem Solver module, that has access to various static and dynamic knowledge sources. The Problem Solver (PS) also performs the updating of the context model, which is represented in two linked dynamic knowledge bases, the Discourse Model and the Belief Model. This approach to language understanding marks the crucial distinction between PLUS and other similar projects: the radical shift from syntax-semantics-based Figure 1 .1 also shows where the main internal interfaces in the architecture are, viz. between the DM and the Natural Language Engine (henceforth NLE), that extracts from an incoming utterance all semantic and pragmatic information that may be relevant for the DM, and between the DM and the PS. The DM uses the same knowledge sources (with the help of the PS) both to build an utterance meaning from the NLE output in analysis and to formulate a semantic content as input for the NLE in generation. One way to differentiate the roles of the NLE and the DM is by considering the knowledge bases they have access to. The grammar and the dictionary are 'private' to the NLE, whereas the other knowledge bases (including the dynamic knowledge bases as well as the remaining static knowledge bases) are private to the DM, via its PS interface.
The Discourse Model is the component in the PLUS architecture that represents the system's knowledge of the discourse context, such as the objects and events that have been mentioned in the ongoing dialogue, and the propositions asserted about them (and in principle also the modal contexts in which they have been asserted). The Belief Model represents the user's current beliefs and intentions, as determined by the To exploit natural language effectively, users of a PLUS-style interface are encouraged to use elliptical forms of expression and pronouns, putting the burden on the system to make sense of these underspecified utterances in context. A representative problem is to determine what is meant by it in the question Does it serve vegetarian food? when the previous discourse has included references to persons, an airport, several restaurants, etc. Natural language referring expressions (nouns, pronouns, descriptive noun phrases, and under the Davidsonian semantics adopted, verbal expressions too) give rise on first use to constants which designate individuals which can be the target of subsequent referring expressions, that are interpreted by the DM with the help of the PS. An important task in interpretation is to determine when one referring expression is coreferential with an existing one. In some cases, linguistic constraints (e.g. number, syntactic structure), can eliminate candidate referents, but it is widely recognised that non-linguistic knowledge is required to resolve such ambiguities in general. The PLUS approach to such phenomena is that this world knowledge is applied abductively by means of general knowledge-base update procedures, so that the best solution will normally be that which gives rise to the fewest new assumptions and the retraction of the fewest previously-held assumptions.
About this book
The chapters in this book all relate to some aspects of the role of abduction, belief, and context in computational pragmatic work, and have been clustered in three groups, in an attempt to do justice to the particular way in which they deal with these concepts.
The chapters in the first cluster (chapters 2-8) are primarily concerned with the construction and discussion of theoretical frameworks for pragmatic processing.
Allwood presents an approach to communication and pragmatics called Communicative Activity Analysis that he has been developing since the mid 70s. After a critical review of speech act theory, of conversational analysis, of relevance theory, and of the work of Grice and Clark, his chapter describes the main concepts and features of his approach. Communicative Activity Analysis views communication as action, which is seen as constituted by a combination of behavioral form, intention, context, and result. Every utterance in a conversation is assumed to have a functional structure with three components: (1) functions obligated by the preceding discourse; (2) functions obligating for the succeeding discourse; (3) 'optional' functions, which are neither obligated not obligating. Obligations are analysed as deriving either from general rational and ethical requirements on communication, from the requirements to manage the interaction, or from interaction between the goals of communicative acts and the embedding activity context. Concerning the latter source of obligations, it is claimed that communicative intentionality has an expressive aspect, which is to express a certain attitude, and an evocative aspect, which is to evoke a certain reaction from the addressee. The various kinds of obligations created by communicative acts and by the embedding activity context, in particular the pairing of obligating and obligated aspects of communicative acts, are assumed to be responsible for the dependencies and regularities that may be observed in dialogues. Communicative Activity Analysis offers a rich conceptual framework for the analysis of human dialogue, and has been influential in the PLUS dialogue project.
Bunt's chapter is concerned with the conceptual and computational modelling of local dialogue contexts, i.e., of the contextual information that is created and changed through communication. To this end he applies his Dynamic Interpretation Theory (DIT), which views utterances as intended to change the local context in certain ways. A particular way to change the context, using the propositional information of the utterance, is called a 'communicative function'; the combination of such a function and a propositional content is called a dialogue act. For the major categories of communicative functions distinguished in DIT, a conceptual analysis is given of the kind of information addressed by a dialogue act and the intended local context change. This leads to a conceptual structure of local dialogue context consisting of six information types. The logical properties of these information types are studied, with particular attention to their logical complexity, their use in inferential processing, their time dependence, their depth of recursion, and mutual dependencies between them. This gives rise to the suggestion that a computational model of local dialogue context is best organised into four components, one of which acts as a dialogue memory. Of the other three components, a central role is played by a dialogue agent's beliefs and intentions regarding the task that motivates the dialogue and regarding the dialogue partner. This information is highly recursive and logically complex. The chapter is concluded by considering two nonstandard formalisms which seem particularly interesting for representing this kind of information: constructive type theory and modular partial models. DIT has played a major role in the dialogue modelling and context representation in the PLUS dialogue project, and has been the basis of the TENDUM and DENK systems.
Ramsay's chapter reviews the use of speech act theory in AI natural language systems and argues that attempts to embody speech acts as simple STRIPS-like planning operators must fail. The difficulties for such an implementation of speech acts arise partly from the fact that there is no reliable way of associating speech act types and linguistic surface forms, and partly from properties of epistemic logic. For instance, an interrogative sentence like Do you know what time it is? can be used as a request to tell the time or as a reproach for being late. Since the sentence itself is ambiguous in this respect, in order to identify which such action has been performed speaker and hearer must already have the additional information (like: hearer is late; both speaker and hearer know this, etc.) available which would be conveyed by saying what action is performed. Nothing can therefore be gained by positing an extra layer of analysis where utterances are characterised as particular types of speech acts. This point is in essence the same as Bunt's argument, made in chapter 3, to the effect that indirect speech acts do not fit into a context-change theory of meaning; it only makes sense to use speech act types that correspond to observable utterance features.
Sabah's chapter examines four fundamentally different approaches to the study of language and communication for their consequences for the architecture of language processing systems, concentrating mainly on how and when to use contextual and other pragmatic knowledge for automatic text understanding. He argues that the control mechanisms traditionally used in language understanding systems are inadequate, and that new mechanisms need to be developed that allow flexibility and reflectivity (i.e., the system can reason about its own control structure). He argues in favour of the use of multi-expert systems for maintaining modularity without introducing artificial ambiguities and proposes additional concepts for making such systems reflective. These considerations have led to the design of the CARAMEL-1 language processing system. To control all the processes participating in a large modular architecture in a way that allows reflectivity, a new memory model is introduced called the Sketchboard. This model is applied to various context-dependent perception and interpretation tasks. Sabah discusses the embedding of heterogeneous modules in a plausible cognitive architecture and how this forms the basis of a new system, CARAMEL-2.
Taylor and Waugh's chapter presents a framework for communication analysis called the Layered Protocol theory, that has been developed by Taylor and co-workers over the years. LP theory takes its inspiration partly from the modelling of communication in computer networks, where the use of layered protocols has become standard. These standards operate according to a 'coding-decoding' model of communication, assuming that the coding transformations applied by one site are inverted at the receiving end. This model is too simple for human communication, as e.g. Sabah argues in his chapter, but LP theory applies its basic ingredients in a model of human communication, assuming that acting and interpreting in the real world is done in a series of layers of abstraction, where each level performs coding and decoding operations in a way that may be described by a protocol. A message may be communicated at any level of abstraction as a 'virtual' message, its reality being implemented at a lower, supporting level, in which the messages are characteristically different in kind. The way a dialogue participant may make progress toward a communicative goal is structured in the form of three basic statements relating to the state of the recipient's understanding of the message. Their beliefs about the basic statements, and about each other's beliefs, determine what each does, which allows a 'General Protocol Grammar' to be defined for a dialogue, which applies at every layer of the LP model. These ideas are illustrated by analysing two sample dialogues from Wizard-of-Oz simulations of the interaction between an information service and a client.
Thijsse's chapter deals with one important aspect of the precise and formal description of the knowledge used and conveyed in conversations, namely the epistemic force of declarative utterances: What is known by the speaker when h/she is uttering an assertion? More precisely, when speaker S utters a sentence with propositional content p, meant to inform a hearer that p, what does this tell us about S's state of information? It seems impossible to say p, but I don't believe that p (Moore's paradox), which suggests that when uttering p, S should be attributed the belief that p. But this does not account for the fact that it seems equally strange to say p, but I don't know whether p (Hintikka's example), which suggests that S should be attributed the knowledge that p. On the basis of a detailed analysis of such puzzles, Thijsse proposes to attribute to S the belief that he knows that p. He shows that this accounts for both Moore's and Hintikka's paradox, and provides a logical reconstruction of Grice's quality maxims. This reconstruction presupposes a distinction between pragmatics and semantics, for which it is argued that independent motivation can be found.
Redeker in her chapter argues that textual coherence and conversational coherence are not as incommensurable as much of the traditional research on those discourse types might suggest. On the basis of current developments in discourse theory and extensive corpus-analytic studies of monologue and dialogue discourse, she develops a framework in which coherence is viewed as consisting of three parallel components: ideational (semantic) structure, rhetorical structure, and sequential (or segment) structure. It is claimed that the ideational, rhetorical, and sequential structures are in principle isomorphic and can for descriptive purposes be conflated into one hierarchical structure of the discourse at hand. The framework, called the Parallel-Components Model, is intended to accommodate both monologue and dialogue structures, although admittedly a lot of work still needs to be done in order to provide a satisfactory account of, for instance, sequential relations in dialogue. The model allows predictions about the use of discourse operators, and predicts complementarity in the lexical marking of ideational and pragmatic links, which is shown to hold in spoken narrative and in newspaper discourse.
The chapters in the second cluster (chapters 9-16) present and discuss various techniques and concepts proposed for computational pragmatic use, with a focus on abductive reasoning.
Neal's chapter is a discussion of the logical nature of abductive reasoning. He compares and contrast the accounts given by Peirce, credited with introducing the term, Charniak and McDermott, who use it extensively in their discussion of how expert systems may be constructed that help find causal explanations of observable symptoms, and finally by Hobbs et al's 'interpretation as abduction' account of natural language utterance interpretation. He finds that they all mis-describe the logical structure of abductive reasoning and proposes that Kenney's schemata for practical reasoning is a better reference point than these authors, as an explanation of the reasoning patterns they actually employ.
Oberlander and Lascarides discuss the interpretation and planning of utterances with implied discourse relations between them, for example: Max fell. John pushed him. In their terms, this discourse is laconic because whilst there is no discourse relational connective like because, the hearer can reliably infer such a relation between the two eventualities. Amongst other things, discourse understanding includes the enrichment of the literal meaning of the two sentences with a discourse relation that renders the utterance reliably coherent. Planning discourses involves being able to predict when this kind of inexplicitness will work. In their chapter, Oberlander and Lascarides claim that defeasible deduction is more suitable to interpretation whilst abduction has a role in planning. Their defeasible deduction reasoning schema has a rule (the 'penguin principle') that prefers the defeasible implication that has the more specific antecedent in case of a conflict. The explanation discourse relation being more specific in this way than narration, and applicable here because the two eventualities have a common key event, it is inferred in the above example. In planning the same text, the explanation and key event rules are applied abductively to build up the discourse structure and to select the linguistic expressions that can realise it. Proposed realisations are then subjected to a test for the reliability with which the discourse structure will be inferrable by the hearer.
Gallagher and Guessoum, having elsewhere proposed consistent knowledge base update as a mechanism for abduction, and also considered its application to anaphor resolution (Guessoum, Black, Gallagher and Wachtel 1993) here make the interesting proposal that the same paradigm can be applied to the problem of strategic control in a dialogue system. Checking the integrity of a database receiving updates depends on knowledge of the inconsistency of certain combinations of assertions. Other chapter authors (esp. Allwood and Bunt) have investigated the way in which in a dialogue an initiating act may create a strong normative pressure for a certain type of response. Gallagher and Guessoum model this by treating the violation of such pressure to respond as an anomaly. If the initiating act is inserted into a KB in which there is an anomaly constraint against an initiative of this type not being met with an appropriate response, the mechanism (intended for logical constraint application) will return a transaction to produce the response as a way of restoring equilibrium.
Hinkelman and Spackman's chapter presents several aspects of speech act recognition as carried out by an implemented natural language understanding system. The first part of this process relies on an HPSG grammar that correlates speech acts with partial linguistic descriptions. They argue that certain configurations of feature structures (with disjunction and negation) are expressively equivalent to implications in predicate logic, and depending on the way in which they are initially instantiated, the unification operation has the effect of deductive or abductive inference. The next part of the chapter describes a simplified technical solution to the representation of mutual beliefs and intentions, namely corporate agents. Individuals as well as groups can form 'corporations', any set of agents with a common purpose, including perhaps even strangers who meet together for a dialogue. Dialogue contribution types (as distinct from speech acts) are definable in terms of the membership of the corporation and of other contributions. For example, the agreement of the corporation z to the proposition p is definable as the conjunction of the inform contribution by a sub-agent x to z or p and the acknowledgement of p by z and the membership of x in z. Speech act recognition and planning can use these rules reversibly, either abductively or inductively. The final part of the chapter discusses an implemented system which conducts dialogues about appointments, applying these ideas.
Beun's work emerges from his empirical analysis of a corpus of spoken information dialogues. The chapter in this volume is concerned with the utterances expressed in the declarative form which function as questions, and how they are reliably interpreted correctly by dialogue participants, whether or not they are marked by intonation as questions. The corpus study revealed a heavy preponderance of declarative forms used when the purpose of the question was verification of something already stated or implicated by the hearer. This was verified experimentally in experiments where subjects were asked to predict continuations of selected dialogues and to express their own confidence in the propositional content conveyed in the earlier part of a dialogue. This work makes a valuable contribution to the empirical study and the understanding of how the choice of particular indirect speech acts is determined by the context. Meyer's chapter discusses the merits of a conceptual modelling approach to the representation of the static and dynamic knowledge that a pragmatics-based language understanding system relies on and updates. CML (Conceptual Modelling Language) uses the basic constructs of objects, labelled attributes and inheritance associated with the frame approach to knowledge representation, now more familiar as the objectoriented paradigm. Many examples are given in illustration of the use of CML-like languages, and Meyer argues in support of claims that this kind of language is suited to the representation of the attitudes of agents; that it is as expressive as more standard logical notations; that its inherent modularity makes models encoded in it extensible and maintainable; that making situations into objects provides a way of representing evolving restricted contexts in which only the most recent and salient discourse acts and events are preferentially accessible to determine interpretation and reaction.
Ferrari, Carenini and Vanocchi's chapter outlines their configuration theory for the representations that must be constructed on the way to determining an interpretation for an utterance. The interpretation itself, the described configuration, is expressed in a sentential form in which a truth value is paired with a logical form. A configuration of realisation is a representation at an intermediate level which includes details of the speaker and addressee, the discourse referents and names used for them in the utterance, a conceptual class for the eventuality in the sentence, the function (speech act type) of the utterance, a record of what was said, etc. The meaning of an utterance is a mapping from a configuration of realisation to a described configuration. The chapter concludes with an exposition of an implemented system based on these ideas.
Bego and van Loo's chapter starts from the observation that many dialogues occur in an instrumental relation to a task in which one of the participants is involved. Grosz's study of the dialogue between a trainee and expert during the assembly of an air compressor is well known, and has been associated with the term 'task-oriented dialogue'. Bego and van Loo point out that this situation, in which the dialogue arises because of the need for the trainee to acquire relevant knowledge to facilitate the contemporaneous executtion of the task, is not the only possible relation between task and dialogue. There are also situations in which the dialogue happens because the agent with the task to carry out needs to acquire knowledge in order to plan its execution. In some cases, the dialogue discusses the goals of the task, and in others, the planner merely discusses some 'parameters' of the task (phone numbers, travel times) without revealing to the expert what the precise goal is. All three of these possible relations of dialogue to task are discussed in relation to the information needs of the agent who will carry out the task, not the one who provides expertise or information. However, Bego and van Loo find in the French literature on this subject a tendency to focus instead on the task of the information provider, and the way in which the information provider (whether telephone operator or computer-based agent) has to manage or even direct the dialogue. Ways of characterising the regulatory principles underlying dialogue are discussed against the background of these two research traditions.
The chapters in the third cluster describe applications of pragmatic frameworks and concepts in the design and implementation of algorithms for dealing with particular aspects of language processing, such as response planning or domain-specific lexical interpretation, or of complete systems.
Carter's chapter argues for the importance of the notion of focus in resolving referential and other ambiguities in discourse. He discusses the distinction between global and local focus and the three related problems of how to structure context representations in which focus plays a dominant part, how to determine the referents of referring expressions as they are encountered, and how the context representation should be updated in response to processed referring expressions. A comparative review is pre-sented of several implemented mechanisms for focus tracking and anaphor resolution, and these are evaluated for their performance and theoretical insight.
Jokinen discusses the problem of formulating responses in information dialogues that observe her minimalism principle, roughly comparable to Grice's Maxim of Quantity, or the kind of contribution that would maintain a laconic discourse as described in Oberlander and Lascarides' chapter. She describes a response planning algorithm which relies on focus tracking together with a set of pragmatic rules and an agenda data structure to determine whether each concept to be expressed as determined by a 'what to say' component should be expressed or elided. The pragmatic rules monitor the accuracy, realisability and consistency of the content of the utterance, whether it addresses the hearer's intentions, and whether it can lead the hearer to draw false implicatures. The focus rules determine whether a term in focus may be suppressed, and hence permit the planner to utter appropriately elliptical linguistic units.
Underwood's chapter considers problems associated with the construction of a conceptual lexicon -that is a mapping of natural language lexemes to concepts. This is not simply a mapping of symbols to symbols, but a mapping of structures to structures, in which the arguments of lexemes must be mapped to attributes of concepts. This knowledge base also stores lexical and sense relations, and when it is designed to support a multilingual system, it also supports bidirectional mappings from the lexemes of more than one language to concepts. Several problems involved in multilingual mappings are discussed, illustrating a need for careful design of the application knowledge base. Its design should not be biased towards the lexical structures of a single language, but should be rich enough in constructs to convey the content that can be expressed in a range of different languages. For a single-language dialogue system, these issues are also pertinent to the response planner's ability to choose how to formulate the system's responses. Examples of lexical-conceptual mappings are given in relation to the same conceptual modelling language that Meyer introduces in his chapter.
Pery-Woodley's chapter is concerned with the identification and evaluation of surface linguistic clues for discourse structure, in particular for thematic and rhetorical structure. She takes discourse structure as the starting point, rather than a set of specialised lexical items, in order to try and identify how it is signalled in particular situations. The analysis is supported by illustrations drawn from two natural processing projects: English Wizard-of-Oz dialogues collected in the PLUS dialogue project, and a French corpus of written concept definitions constructed as part of a project that aims at developing an intelligent tutoring system. Siroux, finally, deals with the incorporation of the concept of cooperativity in dialogue systems from a methodological and engineering point of view. The central thesis of this chapter is that cooperative system behaviour cannot be achieved by the features of a single component; a cooperative system derives its behaviour not from having a single 'cooperation component', but from taking cooperativity into account in all components during the design and implementation phases of a system. This claim is illustrated by analysing the methods for generating cooperative responses in three systems for data base inquiry in natural language.
